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THE AUTHORITY TO BRING 
PRIVATE TREBLE-DAMAGE SUITS 
UNDER "RICO" SHOULD BE REFORMED
This memorandum details some of the serious problems 
that have arisen with the authorisation for private treble­
damage suits under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ­
izations ("RICO") title of the Organized Crime Control Act 
of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. It explains why reform of 
those provisions is necessary now, and why the amendment of 
the private civil action section to establish a prior-criminal­
conviction requirement is the best solution available.
I. INTRODUCTION
With little discussion, the House of Representatives 
in 1970 added the provision for private civil suits to a 
Senate-passed bill that was primarily designed to give the 
Department of Justice new criminal enforcement tools to attack 
"the mob." The Senate had drafted a bill with broad language 
in order to give the Justice Department adequate latitude in 
prosecuting persistent offenders, even if they were not members 
of traditional criminal syndicates. It was expected, however, 
that the Justice Department, in exercising its enforcement 
discretion, would be faithful to the expressed congressional 
purpose to direct the new criminal sanctions against "organized 
crime," as experienced prosecutors understand that term. The 
Justice Department, in fact, has adopted formal guidelines to 
avoid abusive or excessive use of the broad language of RICO,
and has exercised discretion in selecting cases for prosecution 
under RICO. See pp. 46-50, infra.
The provision for private civil suits was added very 
late in the legislative process and was intended to have the 
same focus: protecting legitimate businesses from incursions 
by professional criminals. Congress neglected, however, to 
include any specific mechanism to confine private civil suits 
to cases involving the activities of "organized crime.” 
Private claimants invoking the broadly phrased 
statute have not shown any of the discipline exercised by 
the Justice Department in its selective use of this powerful 
new weapon. As a result, inventive private lawyers seeking 
treble damages are successfully arguing for the most sweeping 
interpretation of RICO's broad language and are attempting 
to apply RICO in contexts far removed from those conceived 
by the statute's supporters. RICO claims are now added as a 
matter of course in virtually all cases challenging securities 
transactions or alleging some type of commercial fraud. RICO 
also crops up in landlord-tenant and real estate disputes, 
attorney-client conflicts, and even divorce battles. By 
contrast, only a tiny handful of the hundreds of cases alleg­
ing private civil claims under RICO involve either the people 
or the conduct that supporters of the bill sought to attack.
Without any of the restraint and responsibility 
that governs the decisions of public prosecutors, private 
lawyers are invoking civil RICO on behalf of private clients
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to level charges of "racketeering" against reputable business­
men and professionals such as investment bankers, brokers, and 
accountants. Although RICO was intended to protect legitimate 
business, the statute is now being used almost exclusively to 
attack established businesses and firms. The threat to bring 
a "racketeering” charge sometimes coerces settlements before 
the filing of a RICO complaint, while the actual filing of a 
RICO complaint exposes businessmen to continuing embarrassment 
and expense.
The Supreme Court has now held that the courts do 
not have the authority to stop the misuse of civil RICO, and 
that only Congress may do so; In its recent decision in 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., ___ U.S. ___ , 53 U.S.L.W. 5034
(July 1, 1985) ("Sedima"), the Court unanimously recognized 
that RICO is being used in ways unintended by Congress, as a 
weapon against legitimate businessmen in ordinary commercial 
disputes. A bare majority of the Court, however, held that 
this unfortunate result "is inherent in the statute as written, 
and its correction must lie with Congress." 53 U.S.L.W. at 
5039. Thus, the unintended targets of RICO actions have 
little or no hope of relief from the courts. The misuse 
repeatedly noted by commentators and courts alike, including 
now the United States Supreme Court, can only be eliminated 
by congressional action.
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II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RICO STATUTE PERMITS 
OVERLY BROAD USE BY PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
The private civil RICO section is 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
Under that provision, a person may press a civil RICO claim if 
he alleges that he was "injured in his business or property by 
reason of" the defendant's "pattern of racketeering activity." 
The plaintiff may recover treble damages as well as costs and 
attorney's fees. The private civil claim under RICO involves 
three main components.
A. Predicate Offenses: 
"Racketeering Activity" 
Congress doubted that it could adequately define 
"organized crime" in a criminal statute in a way that would 
pass constitutional muster. It chose instead to focus on 
the types of conduct in which organized crime figures engage. 
The key to RICO coverage is an extensive list of "predicate" 
offenses that are defined as constituting "racketeering activ­
ity." 18 U.S.C. S 1961. These include a variety of violent 
crimes, such as murder, kidnapping, extortion, and arson — 
crimes that one normally associates with organized crime. In 
addition, because of some indications from the SEC staff that 
organized crime figures were involved in trafficking in stolen 
or counterfeit securities and similar kinds of activity, the 
SEC asked the Senate to expand the list of predicate offenses 
in its bill to include mail fraud, wire fraud, and "fraud in 
the sale of securities." See p. 30, infra.
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B. "Pattern" of Racketeering Activity 
The commission of at least two predicate acts within 
a ten year period is defined to be a "pattern" of racketeering 
activity. The initial step in a plaintiff's civil RICO claim 
is to assert that a "person" — including the whole spectrum 
of legitimate business corporations, associations, partner­
ships, and their executives — committed two predicate acts 
within ten years and thus engaged in a "pattern of racketeer­
ing activity."
Unfortunately, this sweeping coverage makes virtually 
any businessman or business organization a potential target of 
a RICO claim. Since the two predicate offenses may not need 
to be separated in time or involve different transactions, a 
claimant may allege that a single commercial transaction that 
generates a dispute constitutes a "pattern of racketeering." 
For example, an investor may allege simply that a securities 
transaction consisting of two steps involved fraud. This 
allegation may make out a "pattern of racketeering activity" 
involving "fraud in the sale of securities." Similarly, a 
would-be RICO plaintiff may assert that two separate copies of 
a financial statement, bill, contract, advertisement or other 
document involved in an allegedly "fraudulent" transaction 
were sent through the mails. As Justice Marshall, writing for 
four Justices of the Supreme Court in the Sedima case, recog­
nized, "the effects of making a mere two instances of mail or
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wire fraud potentially actionable under civil RICO are stagger­
ing 53 U.S.L.W. at 5040, because of the breadth of those 
statutory provisions.
C. "Enterprise" Requirement
RICO also requires that the person commit the predi­
cate acts in a particular relationship to an "enterprise.” 
Under the statute, it is unlawful to obtain any interest in 
an "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering activity, 
to control an enterprise through such activity, or to conduct 
the affairs of an enterprise through racketeering activity.
18 U.S.C. § 1962. Depending on the facts, a plaintiff can 
easily satisfy the "enterprise" requirement in actions against 
legitimate businesses or businessmen by alleging that, for 
example, the defendant corporation or professional partnership 
is the "enterprise" that is conducting its affairs improperly.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL 
"RICO" SHOWS A PURPOSE TO PROTECT 
LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES
The bill that became the 1970 Organized Crime Control
Act, including the RICO title, originated in the Senate. The
Senate report stated unambiguously the objective of the legis­
lation :
"[T]he eradication of organized crime in the 
United States by strengthening the legal tools 
in the evidence-gathering process, by establish­
ing new penal prohibitions, and by providing 
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal 
with the unlawful activities of those engaged 
in organized crime." S. Rep. No. 617, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) (emphasis added).
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In this vein. Senator McClellan, the bill's chief 
sponsor and a longtime foe of organised crime, focused his 
arguments for the bill on the Insidious activities of "La Cosa 
Nostra." 116 Cong. Rec. 585-86 (1970). In particular, his 
sponsorship reflected awareness that, when "organized crime 
moves into a business, it usually brings to that venture all 
the techniques of violence and intimidation which it used in 
its illegal businesses." 115 Cong. Rec. 5874 (1969). The 
Senate wanted to provide a mechanism to respond to reports 
that "organized crime has begun to penetrate* some legitimate 
businesses, such as securities firms from which it was steal­
ing securities. See S. Rep. No. 617, supra, at 77; 116 Cong. 
Rec. 591 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
The House shared this concern about the infiltration 
of organized crime into businesses across the nation. Thus, 
when Congressman Poff, a leading proponent of the legislation, 
pointed to the takeover of a jukebox business by "a mafia 
boss," he illustrated the general understanding that RICO was 
meant to protect legitimate business people injured by organized 
crime. 116 Cong. Rec. 6709 (1970).
The Senate RICO bill had contained no provision for 
private civil suits when Senator McClellan introduced it, when 
the Judiciary Committee added the fraud predicates, or when 
the Senate initially passed the bill. A private civil remedy 
finally was added to the RICO legislation in the House Judi­
ciary Committee at the urging of Representative Steiger, who
7
submitted the drift of the language that ultimately became 
law. In submitting the amendment. Representative Steiger 
explained that his proposal was designed to add a private 
remedy to help in the fight "to deal with organized crime." 
Organized Crime Control: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 
of the Committee on the Judiciary on S. 30 and Related Propo­
sals Relating to the Control of Organized Crime in the United 
States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 519 (1970). He carefully empha­
sized his understanding that RICO was designed "to prevent 
and reverse the corrupt infiltration of legitimate commercial 
activities by ruthless organized criminals." Id. So as to 
leave no room to doubt that he expected that the new statute, 
including his civil damage remedy, would be directed against 
"ruthless, organized criminals," Representative Steiger 
described examples of penetration of legitimate businesses by 
various "families" of "La Cosa Nostra" — the Mafia. Id. In 
the sparse debate on the civil damage provision when the bill 
reached the House floor, the Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee, Representative Celler, explained that the addition 
of a treble-damage remedy was to be one of the tools "designed 
to inhibit the infiltration of legitimate business by organized 
crime." 116 Cong. Rec. 35,196 (1970).
The bill returned to the Senate shortly before 
adjournment, and the Senate accepted the amended version 
without seeking a conference. In doing so, however, no 
one suggested that the focus of congressional concern —
8
protection of legitimate businessmen — had shifted in the 
slightest. Indeed, Senator McClellan described the House 
amendments, including the addition of the civil provision, 
as "comparatively . . . minor changes.” 116 Cong. Rec. 36,293 
(1970). At no time did any supporter of the bill suggest that 
the private civil remedy was intended for use against legiti­
mate business people, corporations, or partnerships of licensed 
professionals, or was to be used in commercial disputes having 
nothing whatever to do with the activities that were and are 
commonly recognized as "organized crime."
IV. THE USE OF THE PRIVATE CIVIL DAMAGE 
PROVISION HAS ACTUALLY UNDERMINED  
THE CONGRESSIONAL OBJECTIVE
In light of the unambiguous congressional focus, 
civil RICO actions should closely parallel criminal prosecu­
tions. Instead, civil RICO is used almost exclusively in 
commercial disputes, against what Assistant Attorney General 
Stephen S. Trott, in testifying on RICO before this Committee 
on May 20, 1985, called "conduct bearing little resemblence 
to organized crime activity in the traditional sense." The 
statute is now being invoked in every kind of litigation where 
a litigant can possibly allege the predicate offense of "fraud". 
Virtually all of these claims are either covered by specific 
federal regulatory laws such as the securities laws or do not 
belong in the federal courts at all. In the vast majority of 
cases, civil RICO claims are being used as weapons against 
the very people Congress was seeking to protect: legitimate
9
business people. Not only have these developments distorted 
congressional expectations, but they also present widely recog­
nized and increasing opportunities for abuse.
A. The Ability Of A Private Lawyer 
To Charge A Person With Criminal 
"Racketeering" Is Easily Abused
RICO is unprecedented in authorizing private lawyers 
who are representing purely private clients to invoke the 
judicial process by charging another private person with 
crimes. Under RICO, the private lawyer exercises power that 
normally is reserved to public officials and grand jurors: 
the power to lodge a formal accusation of crime. Those public 
officials and grand jurors, Of course, have a duty of fair ness 
and restraint in deciding whether to make that kind of accusa­
tion. As the Supreme Court once described the special respon­
sibilities of prosecutors:
"The United States Attorney is the representa­
tive not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but 
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impar­
tially is as compelling as its obligation to govern 
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but 
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a 
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the 
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall 
not escape or innocence suffer." Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
A private lawyer, by contrast, owes allegiance 
to his client’s private interest, not to a higher sense of 
justice. His interest is not in impartiality, but in partisan 
advocacy. He is his client’s servant, not the servant of the 
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law. Bis client's interest is not that "justice" be done, but 
that he obtain money from the defendant.
Because of these fundamental differences, our system 
surrounds the exercise of prosecutorial power with many legal 
and ethical restrictions not applicable to the private attor­
ney. The officials who exercise prosecutorial discretion are 
accountable to the public for their judgments. As a further 
shield against overzealousness, the Constitution interposes 
grand jurors who, like the prosecutor himself, are sworn to 
secrecy while the prosecutor is attempting to demonstrate that 
there is substantial evidence to justify a proposed criminal 
charge. None of these restrictions, however, applies to a 
private lawyer who is considering filing a civil lawsuit in 
order to promote his client's financial interests.
The private claimant's power to brand a businessman 
or firm a "racketeer" may cause almost as much irreversible 
injury to the legitimate businessman as may an unwarranted 
criminal charge. Business rivals may use this power to gain 
economic advantage without actually having to go beyond the 
threat to file a civil RICO suit. The people who are monitor­
ing the actual use of civil RICO know that this is the reality 
not mere speculation. As Justice Marshall noted in the Sedima 
decision: ”[T]he defendant, facing a tremendous financial 
exposure in addition to the threat of being labelled a 'rac­
keteer,' will have a strong interest in settling the dispute."
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53 U.S.L.W. at 5041. Ironically, therefore, civil RICO 
creates an opportunity for civil claimants to engage in a form 
of extortion, even though the criminal features of the statute 
are geared to prevent similar exactions by organized crime 
figures.
Several recent RICO cases illustrate the full range 
of the distortion to which the present language of the civil 
RICO provision lends itself and the difficulties the courts 
are having in applying the statute sensibly. In at least two 
instances RICO has been invoked in religious squabbles, and 
the trial judges have struggled to make RICO inapplicable. In 
Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125
(D. Mass. 1982), the district court was faced with a claim 
brought by a disaffected former adherent of the Scientologists 
alleging fraudulent misrepresentations. The RICO claim in 
Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555 
(E.D.N.Y. 1983), turned on a dispute about the proper suc­
cession to the "Skolyer Rebbe," a Chassidic Jewish leadership 
position. The plaintiffs invoked "mail fraud" and other 
predicate offenses based on alleged misrepresentations by the 
defendants about their right to administer the congregation.1/ 
the bizarre uses to which RICO may be put are not 
limited to religious disputes. RICO is being used as well in
1/The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that 
the religious issues were non-justiciable. 566 F. Supp. at 
558.
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disputes between spouses and over inheritance. See Report of 
the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the ABA Section of Corpora­
tion, Banking and Business Law ("ABA RICO Task Force Report") 
39 n.41 (1985). In another recent case, a RICO suit was filed 
against former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democratic 
National Committee and several individual members of the DNC, 
alleging that the defendants offered political contributions 
to other Democratic candidates in exchange for promises not 
to oppose Reagan Administration policies. While the court 
dismissed the claim, it did so solely on the ground that the 
plaintiffs had failed to allege acts that fell within the 
predicate acts specified in the statute.. Taylor v. Mondale, 
Civ. No. 84-3149 (D.D.C. May 7, 1985), reported in Civil RICO 
Report (BNA), June 5, 1985, at 6. Thus, the court found 
nothing wrong with the basic use of RICO, only with the choice 
of the particular criminal acts pleaded as predicate offenses. 
In addition, at least one federal court has held that the 
fraud predicates supported a civil RICO claim for damages 
against FBI agents who orchestrated an undercover "sting" 
operation. Lightner v. Tremont Auto Auction, No. 82C 20090 
(N.D. Ill. June 29, 1984), reported in 1 RICO Litigation 
Reporter 317 (September 1984). It is hard to imagine a more 
glaring illustration of the point that civil RICO is now being 
used against the very people it was designed to aid.
13
B. Civil RICO Suits Are Directed 
Mostly At Well Established 
Businesses, Wot Organized Crime
The American Bar Association's special RICO Task 
Force recently collected comprehensive data about hundreds 
of private civil RICO cases, almost all of which have been
reported since 1982.2/ The Report classified the essential
allegations underlying the RICO charges as follows:
Percentage
40%
37%
4%
Underlying Allegation
securities fraud
common law fraud in a 
commercial setting
antitrust or unfair competition
4%
3%
2%
1%
9%
bribery or commercial bribery 
other fraud 
labor disputes 
theft or conversion 
offenses associated with
professional criminal 
act ivity 3/
Another private survey located 132 civil RICO cases 
in which opinions have been published. According to the 
descriptions of allegations contained in those cases, they 
fall into the following categories:
2/ABA RICO Task Force Report at 53, 55 (of the cases 
collected in the Report’s database, 3% were decided prior to 
1980, 2% were decided in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982, 33% in 
1983, and 43% in 1984).
3/Id. at 55-56.
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Securities transactions 
Commercial and contract disputes 38
Commodities trading 6
Bank loans 6
Antitrust price fixing 3
Religious disputes 2
Divorce 1
Union affairs 3
Commercial bribery/kickbacks 2
Political corruption (including 9
57
official extortion and bribery)
Theft (by cleaners from apartment dwellers) 1
Violent crimes (murder, arson, extortion) 3
Thus, cases that could fairly be characterized as having 
anything to do with aiding the war on organized crime are 
4/ a tiny minority.4/
In his recent testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee on the need for civil RICO reform, Assistant Attorney
General Trott of the Department of Justice reported that the 
Department's own survey of private RICO cases confirmed this 
pattern of massive abuse. He estimated that, as a result of
4/Both the majority and minority opinions in the Sedima 
accepted and cited these statistics. 53 U.S.L.W. at 5039 n.16, 
5041. Both recognized that this result was not what Congress 
intended; they diverged only on the question whether the courts 
may properly do anything to prevent future use of the statute 
in this manner. The majority concluded that this is a task 
for Congress, not the courts. See pp. 31-35, infra.
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the increasing use of civil RICO in commercial disputes, the 
actual number of private cases filed already exceeds 500.
According to the Justice Department's calculations, only about 
71 of these cases involve either actual organized crime 
figures or the kinds of criminal conduct common to organized 
crime syndicates. As Assistant Attorney General Trott con­
cluded:
"Experience has shown . . . that the instances 
of private civil RICO's use against traditional 
organized crime activities are far outweighed by 
example of its application as a general federal 
anti-fraud remedy against seemingly reputable 
businessmen.”
On some occasions, private plaintiffs have used 
civil RICO to pursue people who had first Seen prosecuted and 
convicted of the predicate acts or RICO itself. The three 
civil RICO cases noted in the private survey of 132 cases 
which involved allegations of gangster-like conduct — murder, 
arson and extortion — were cases filed after the authorities 
had obtained criminal convictions. See Anderson v. Janovich, 
543 F. Supp. 1124 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (tavern owner claimed that 
convicted competitors tried to control local tavern business 
through threats of murder and arson); State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 
1982) (insurance company sought to recover fraudulently 
obtained proceeds after convictions in arson-for-hire case); 
City of Milwaukee v. Hansen, No. 77-C-246 (E.D. Wis. January 
13, 1981) (city sought to recover costs incurred in fighting 
fires started by convicted arsonists). In addition, about a 
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dozen other civil RICO cases have followed criminal convic­
tions, generally for some form of political corruption. In 
one recent case, the Seventh Circuit upheld a RICO judgment 
against a defendant sued after he had pleaded guilty to 
charges of mail fraud based on the same conduct. See McCul­
lough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1985). In another 
recently filed action, a corporation brought RICO claims 
against, inter alia, two individuals who had recently pleaded 
guilty to federal securities law violations. Anheuser-Busch 
Companies, Inc. v. Thayer, No. 3-85-0794-R (N.D. Tex.; com­
plaint filed April 26, 1985), reported in Racketeer Litigation 
Reporter at 695 (May 1985). RICO thus can be, and has been, 
used to pursue civil remedies against convicted felons.
In most civil RICO cases, however, the public author­
ities have not found a basis to proceed with any criminal 
charges. There has been, therefore, no careful screening by 
publicly accountable officials before private claimants have 
charged those defendants with criminal "racketeering." This 
is not surprising, because public officials would not have 
considered it fair or accurate to brand the defendants in 
these cases "racketeers.” Indeed, one commentator, who 
maintains the computerized database of civil RICO decisions 
upon which the ABA RICO Task Force relied and who served as 
Executive Director of that Task Force, concluded that, "real­
istically speaking, the likelihood of state or federal prose­
cutors seeking indictments in the vast majority of these types
17
of cases is as close to zero as anything could be." Weissman, 
"Circuit Aims To Curb Private Civil RICO Actions," Legal Times, 
August 20, 1984, at 12. Thus, these civil cases are not sup­
plementing the enforcement efforts of prosecutors who simply 
lack the resources to deal with all the offenses deserving 
prosecution. Instead, these cases involve, with rare excep­
tions, disputes that no responsible prosecutor would brand as 
criminal, much less as the manifestations of "organized crime* 
or "racketeering."
Although the burden of RICO's misuse does not fall 
solely on persons in the financial community and in related 
professional services, the burden has become especially severe 
for these people because they are viewed as vulnerable "deep 
pockets" whenever an investment or a commercial transaction 
goes sour. As The New York Times reported, despite the 
expectation that civil RICO would focus on "mobster deals,” 
"legitimate businesses” such as Morgan Stanley, American 
Express, and Lloyd's of London have "found their names smeared 
with racketeering charges. . . ." N.Y. Times, September 4, 
1984, at D2.5/ A partial roster of defendants in civil RICO 
suits includes the following established and respected enti­
ties that private claimants have charged with a "pattern of 
racketeering":
5/In light of civil RICO's unintended use as a weapon 
against "ordinary enterprises," The New York Times recently 
called for a legislative "repair job" on RICO's civil treble­
damage provisions. "Where To Fix The Rackets Law," N.Y. Times, 
July 8, 1985, at A16.
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Investment bankers and broken
Beebe Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc. 
Bear Sterns & Co.
Dean Witter Reynolds 
Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc. 
Loeb Rhodes & Co., Inc.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner a Smith, Inc. 
Morgan Stanley a Co., Inc.
Oppenheimer a Co.
Paine Webber Jackson a Curtis, Inc. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc.
Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc.
National C.P.A. Firms
Alexander Grant & Company 
Arthur Andersen & Co. 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Ernst & Whinney 
Laventhol & Horwath 
Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co. 
Price Waterhouse 
Touche Ross & Co.
Law Firms
Lord, Bissel & Brook 
Pierson, Ball & Dowd 
Singer, Hutner, Levine a Seemans 
Sullivan a Worchester
Banks
Citibank, N.A.
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. 
Crocker National Bank 
First American Bankshares, Inc.
First Interstate Bank of Oregon 
First National Bank of Atlanta 
First National Bank of Maryland 
Marine National Bank (Wisconsin) 
National Republic Bank of Chicago 
Pacific Western Bank 
Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. 
Sierra Federal Savings & Loan Association 
Southwest National Bank 
State Bank of India 
Union Bank
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Insurance Companies 
Allstate Insurance Co. 
Lincoln Insurance Co. 
Prudential Insurance Co. of America 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
Travelers Insurance Co.
Underwriters of Lloyd's, London 
USLIFE Corp.
Manufacturing Companies
A.H. Robins Co., Inc. 
Boeing Co.
Continental Group, Inc.
General Motors Corp. 
Miller Brewing Co. 
Mitsui & Co. (U.S.A.), Inc. 
Rockwell International Corp. 
Rohm & Haas Co.
Firms like those have been named as defendents in dozens of 
civil RICO suits, even though the Justice Department has not 
seen merit enough even to file criminal charges against them, 
much less to obtain convictions. Of course, the enormous 
expenses associated with defending against unchecked civil 
RICO claims become a cost of doing business that ultimately 
taxes the consumers of the goods and services provided by 
these firms and by their customers and clients.
C. Civil RICO Is Used Most Extensively 
In Ordinary Commercial Disputes
As the figures demonstrate, the vast bulk of private 
civil RICO cases have come in commercial contexts — hardly 
in the settings that Congress thought needed bold new weapons 
or special incentives to sue. All its sponsors expressly 
agreed that RICO was aimed at preventing the infiltration of 
legitimate business by organized crime.
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The draftsmen certainly did not intend, for example, 
to have RICO become a device for challenging corporate takeover 
bids or to add a new level of regulation of those hotly 
contested deals. Yet, as SEC member Charles Marinaccio told 
this Committee in May of this year, "[i]t has become standard 
practice to add a RICO charge to lawsuits challenging tender 
offers." Statement of Charles L. Marinaccio, Member of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Before the Committee on 
the Judiciary, United States Senate, May 20, 1985, at 3; 
see, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 
1983); Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., 
592 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Tex.), modified, 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 
1984). In Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, supra, the court of 
appeals expressed concern about attempts to use RICO to block 
a takeover bid through a public tender offer, pointing out 
that this is simply one illustration of the unintended and 
excessive use of civil RICO: 
"Finally, we note the mounting controversy in the 
federal courts over the proper limits, if any, 
upon the use of RICO in cases far removed from 
the context which Congress had in mind when it 
enacted the statute. Congress was out to attack 
the problem of organized crime, not the problem 
of corporate control and risk arbitrage. We of 
course make no attempt to resolve the dispute 
here and now. We do not propose to enter the 
fray. We only note that the reach of RICO is 
itself a troubling issue . . . ." 701 F.2d at 291.
See also Tyson & August, The Williams Act After RICO: Has The 
Balance Tipped In Favor Of Incumbent Management?, 35 Hastings 
L.J. 53, 111-12 (1983) ("By giving target management a powerful 
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new weapon in the takeover battle, the judicial approval of 
RICO suits predicated on Williams Act violations undermines 
the careful policy of evenhandedness that the Williams Act 
Congress sought so hard to attain").
The treble-damage weapon of RICO and the "racketeer­
ing" label are also being used to challenge the ways banks set 
up their loan procedures and terms. For instance, in Morosani 
v, First National Bank of Atlanta, 703 F.2d 1220 (11th Cir. 
1983), the Eleventh Circuit has allowed a case to proceed on 
the claim that the "prime rate” used in computing the interest 
on the plaintiff's loan was not the bank's true prime rate. 
 
The Supreme Court recently agreed that RICO sweeps so broadly 
as to encompass such a case. See Haroco v. American National 
Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, ___
U.S. ___ , 53 U.S.L.W. 5067 (July 1, 1985) (per curiam). In
Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F. Supp. 675 (N.D. Ill. 1982), the court 
explained why it, too, felt obliged to entertain a RICO suit 
involving alleged misrepresentations relating to a commercial 
loan: 
"Congress may not have envisioned that the civil 
remedies it supplied in RICO would find the wide­
spread use that they have in commercial fraud 
cases. And such use of RICO's remedies may well 
be somewhat undesirable. But, when a plaintiff 
makes allegations which appear to state a claim 
under the statute as it is written, it is not the 
function of this Court to reject that claim on the 
ground that Congress must have meant something 
other than what it said in the statute." 557 
F. Supp. at 681.
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RICO counts have already appeared in many other cases 
involving disputed commercial transactions, including churning 
of stock,6/ representations about a broker's expertise,7/ pro­
jections used in real estate syndication,8/ disputes between 
landlord and tenant,9/ disallowance of insurance claims,10/ 
alleged overcharges by a printer,11/ and failure to publish 
a medical journal according to a contractual agreement.12/ 
Because Congress included open-ended "fraud” predicates, there 
is ample room for transforming even more kinds of commercial 
disputes into RICO cases.
Although the "fraud" predicates are the easiest to 
abuse by artful pleading, they are not alone. In a recent 
decision, the Fourth Circuit ordered reinstatement of a civil 
RICO case brought by a condominium developer who alleged that
6/see, e.g., Harper v. New Japan Securities International, 
Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal 1982).
7/See, e.g., Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 
1983).
8/Gordon v. Terry, 684 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1203 (1983).
9/pit Pros, Inc. v. Wolf, 554 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill. 
1983).
10/Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 
352 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
11/Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Harco Graphics, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 
83 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
12/American Society of Contemporary Medicine, Surgery 
& Opthalmology v. Murray Communications, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 
462 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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the purchasers of an office condominium unit were trying to 
"extort" an unreasonably high price from him in connection 
with the developer's effort to repurchase the condo unit in 
order to include it in a block of units the developer wanted 
to sell to IBM. Although the district court found that this 
was *at best a garden-variety commercial breach of contract” 
case, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the allegations might 
make out a claim of ”extortion” under state law and, there­
fore, the plaintiff could press the case under RICO. Battle­
field Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984). 
The two businessmen who originally bought the condominium unit 
—and their wives as co-defendants — now stand accused of 
being racketeers and must defend themselves against a statute 
that Congress believed would protect business people from, in 
Representative Steiger's words, ”ruthless organized criminals.
D. The Inclusion Of Fraud-Based Predicate 
Offenses Is The Source Of Most Of The 
Abuse Of Civil RICO
Without doubt, the single most important aspect 
of RICO that permits plaintiffs to transform commercial 
disputes into federal treble-damage actions is the inclusion 
of "mail fraud,” "wire fraud,” and "fraud in the sale of 
securities" in the list of predicate offenses. The com­
prehensive survey by the ABA Special Task Force on Civil RICO 
ascertained that 91% of RICO claims appear in cases that 
involve sales of securities or commodities or relate to 
contract disputes or other ordinary commercial transactions. 
See ABA RICO Task Force Report at 55-56. Although Congress 
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added the fraud-based predicates at a time when RICO did not 
provide for a private remedy, and it added the private remedy 
at the last minute without careful consideration of how it 
would be used, the result, to quote the words of Justice 
Marshall in Sedima, "quite simply revolutionizes private 
litigation." 53 U.S.L.W. at 5040. Justice Marshall went on: 
"The single most significant reason for the expansive use of 
civil RICO has been the presence in the statute, as predicate 
acts, of mail and wire fraud violations." Id. Be similarly 
recognized that the fraud-based predicates allow a plaintiff 
to bypass the federal securities laws in favor of a claim 
under RICO. Id. at 5041. The result. Justice Marshall and 
these other Justices realized, is "the federalization of broad 
areas of state common law of frauds, and . . . the displacement 
of well-established federal remedial provisions." Id. at 5040. 
Claims based on "mail fraud" and "wire fraud" pre­
dicate offenses are easy to plead in many commercial disputes. 
They are also likely to survive motions to dismiss made at 
early stages. This is so because the underlying law in this 
area has been developed in criminal prosecutions under broadly 
worded criminal statutes. Courts have been willing to allow 
public officials to use broad prosecutorial discretion in 
determining which transactions are properly prosecutable:
"The crime of mail fraud is [broad] in scope. 
The fraudulent aspect of the scheme to ’defraud' 
is measured by a non-technical standard. Law 
puts its imprimatur on the accepted moral stan­
dards and condemns conduct which fails to match 
the ’reflection of moral uprightness, of fun­
damental honesty, fair play and right dealing
25
in the general and business life of members of 
society.' This is indeed broad." Blachly v. 
United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967) 
(citations omitted).
In almost any instance where a venture has lost money, or a 
stock has fallen in value, a disappointed investor can allege 
that the businessman’s behavior was not a "reflection of 
moral uprightness" and "fair play.” As Justice Marshall noted 
in his opinion in Sedima:
"The effects of making a mere two instances of 
mail or wire fraud potentially actionable under 
civil RICO are staggering, because in recent 
years Courts of Appeals have 'tolerated an 
extraordinary expansion of mail and wire fraud 
statutes to permit federal prosecution for 
conduct that some had thought was subject only 
to state criminal and civil law.'" 53 U.S.L.W. 
at 5040, quoting United States v. Weiss, 752 
F.2d 777, 791 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman J., dis­
senting ).
Justice Marshall recognized that "(t]he only restrain­
ing influence on the 'inexorable expansion of the mail and 
wire fraud statutes,' United States v. Siegal, 717 F.2d, at 24 
(Winter, J., dissenting in part), has been the prudent use of 
prosecutorial discretion." 53 U.S.L.W. at 5040. The courts 
have permitted the expansive reading of the mail and wire 
fraud statute knowing full well that no private right of 
action existed under those criminal statutes. Id. Although 
Congress has never directly authorized private civil suits 
under the mail or wire fraud statutes, the inclusion of 
those offenses among the predicates for a civil suit under 
RICO now has given this vast discretion to private claimants 
through the back door.
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The result, as Justice Marshall wrote, is an enormous 
expansion in federal jurisdiction over ordinary civil disputes: 
"In the context of civil RICO . . . the restraining 
influence of prosecutors is completely absent. . . . 
[S]uch litigants, lured by the prospect of treble 
damages and attorney's fees, have a strong incentive 
to invoke RICO's provisions whenever they can allege 
in good faith two instances of nail or wire 
fraud. . . . The civil RICO provision consequently 
stretches the mail and wire fraud statutes to their 
absolute limits and federalizes important areas of 
civil litigation that until now were solely within 
the domain of the states." Id. at 5041.
As one former federal prosecutor recently wrote in calling for 
legislation to delete "the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes 
from the list of predicate acts required to bring a private 
civil RICO action:"
"[A] general problem with RICO, that the constraints 
of prosecutorial discretion and guidelines which 
limit its application in the criminal sphere are no 
bar to its private civil application . . ., is most 
acute when the underlying predicate statutes are 
mail fraud and wire fraud, since it is the breadth 
of these statutes, both actual and potential, that 
forms the basis for most of the recent expansion of 
civil RICO litigation." Rakoff, "Opinion," 1 RICO 
Litigation Reporter 206-07, 211 (September 1984).
Nothing in the legislative history of RICO suggests 
Congress intended to federalize local commercial disputes. 
Continued inclusion of "mail fraud" and "wire fraud* as predi­
cates for civil RICO claims, however, allows private plaintiffs 
to disregard these concerns about federalism and to transform 
local disputes into federal cases simply because one of the 
parties used the mail or the telephone.
Similarly, private plaintiffs find it easy to level 
allegations of "securities fraud." Since the federal courts
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are reluctant to dismiss complaints before a plaintiff has 
had a chance to pursue substantial discovery in a search of 
evidence to support his allegations of "fraud," these cases 
withstand initial challenges. Even if the predicate offense 
that a plaintiff must ultimately prove in a civil RICO case 
is criminal securities fraud, a plaintiff may not even have 
to allege — much less prove -- a deliberate intent to defraud 
him. For example, in United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976), the court 
upheld the conviction of a partner in a major accounting 
firm. On the basis of a finding that he had "recklessly" 
conducted a corporate audit, he was convicted of assisting in 
the corporation's filing of a false proxy statement in viola­
tion of 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). The trial judge, in sentencing 
the accountant, indicated that no finding of actual knowledge 
of falsity was necessary for conviction:
"I think you are absolutely sincere when you say 
that you do not believe that you did anything 
wrong in this audit or audits. . . . But the 
tragedy is that the jury found that this was an 
audit or audits done with reckless disregard for 
what was really involved." United States v. 
Natelli, 74 Cr. 43 (S.D.N.Y.), Transcript of 
Sentencing at 12.
Thus, a plaintiff may be able to assert a viable RICO claim 
based on alleged "fraud in the sale of securities" simply by 
claiming that the defendants were reckless in their actions, 
and that, as a result, a "fraudulent" filing or similar 
securities law violation occurred.
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Moreover, the result of converting securities fraud 
claims into RICO claims is to displace the carefully structured 
remedies of the federal securities laws. First, civil RICO has 
unwittingly created a treble-damage remedy for ordinary 
securities law violations even though "the federal securities 
laws contemplate only compensatory damages and ordinarily do 
not authorize recovery of attorney’s fees." Sedima, 53 
U.S.L.W. at 5041 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Second, under 
RICO the plaintiff can raise the non-monetary stakes as well, 
because now the defendant runs the risk of being branded a 
"racketeer." As Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and 
Powell recognized, the result of this double-barrel risk is 
not justice, but capitulation:
"Many a prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, 
will decide to settle even a case with no merit. 
It is thus not surprising that civil RICO has been 
used for extortive purposes, giving rise to the 
very evils that it was designed to combat." Id.
Third, and perhaps most important, this use of civil 
RICO "virtually eliminates decades of legislative and judicial 
development of private civil remedies under the federal securi­
ties laws." Id. This end-run around the requirements of the 
securities laws is possible because a RICO plaintiff can simply 
allege a RICO violation based on mail or wire fraud predicate 
acts, rather than "securities fraud," growing out of a securi­
ties transaction. Thus, despite that fact that "[o]ver the 
years, courts have paid close attention to matters such as 
standing, culpability, causation, reliance and materiality, 
as well as the definitions of ’securities’ and 'fraud,'" id.,
29
the broad swath that the civil RICO's fraud provisions cut 
through established legal principles makes all of this care­
fully fashioned law "now an endangered species . . . ." Id.
The Senate added securities fraud, as well as wire 
and mail fraud, to the bill's list of predicates at the 
suggestion of the SEC's Division of Enforcement because 
organized crime figures had begun to engage in market manipu­
lation and securities theft. The SEC officials recommended 
the changes when they understood that the legislation would 
provide only for government, not private, remedies. They 
believed that RICO could serve as an important weapon for 
government enforcement against those activities. See ABA 
Civil RICO Task Report at 99-100 n.130. When the House added 
the private civil remedy, no one suggested that the securities 
fraud predicate was intended to displace the specific statutory 
scheme long in place.
Moreover, when Congress decided to add securities 
fraud as a RICO predicate, it referred to only one significant 
kind of misconduct that was not already covered by the federal 
securities laws but was attracting organized crime: traffick­
ing in stolen or counterfeit securities. Experience has shown, 
however, that civil RICO is not being used against schemes of 
that type. By including the securities fraud predicates, RICO 
instead allows private claimants to duplicate — but for 
treble damages — the rights already granted by the federal 
securities laws or allows them to circumvent the limitations 
that Congress has deliberately fashioned for civil suits under 
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those laws. In neither type of situation is there any justi­
fication for tolerating the costly mischief that civil RICO 
permits.
E. The Supreme Court Has Held That 
Congress, Not the Courts, Must 
Correct Civil RICO*S Overbreadth 
Up until recently, several trial judges and one 
federal circuit attempted to restrain the use of civil RICO 
in ordinary commercial disputes. Some tried to treat the 
statute as requiring an allegation of some actual connection 
with "organized crime." E.g., American Savings Ass'n v. 
Sierra Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 586 F. Supp. 888 (D. 
Colo. 1984). Others tried to require a showing of some 
special "racketeering injuries." E.g., Harper v. New Japan 
Securities International Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 
1982). These efforts generally met with hostility in most 
appellate courts. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 
719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 
(1984) (rejecting requirement of link to "organized crime"); 
Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 
1984) (same); Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 
731 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1984) (same); Schacht v. Brown, 711 
F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983) 
(rejecting special injury requirement); Alexander Grant & Co. 
v. Tiffany Industries, Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984) 
(same).
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This past term, the Supreme Court dashed whatever 
faint hope had existed that judicial construction of the 
statute could tame runaway civil RICO. In a 5-4 vote, the 
Court overturned a decision of the Second Circuit in which the 
court of appeals had held that a civil RICO claim could only 
be brought against a defendant who had been convicted of the 
predicate acts underlying the RICO claim or of RICO itself 
and could only be brought to collect damages for a separate 
"racketeering injury," wholly distinct from injury arising 
from the predicate acts themselves. Sedima, supra. At the 
same time, the Court affirmed a Seventh Circuit decision in 
which the lower court had rejected the requirement of a  
separate injury. American National Bank v. Haroco, Inc., ___
U.S. ___ , 53 U.S.L.W. 5067 (July 1, 1985) (per curiam). In
deciding these cases, the Court made it crystal clear that any 
correction in the course civil RICO has taken must come from 
Congress, not the courts.
The Court was unanimous in recognizing that civil 
RICO had strayed far from the object that Congress had in 
mind when it wrote and passed the Act. The majority opinion 
in Sedima acknowledged that it understood the "concern over 
the consequences of an unbridled reading of the statute," and 
the Second Circuit’s perception of "misuse of civil RICO." 
53 U.S.L.W. at 5034. The majority opinion also recognized 
that, "in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into 
something quite different from the original conception of 
its enactors," id. at 5039, and that "private civil actions
32
under the statute are being brought almost solely against" 
what the Court called "respected and legitimate enterprises," 
rather than against "the archetypal, intimidating mobster.” 
Id. And the majority cited with approval the statistics from 
the ABA Task Force Report, see pp. 14-15, supra, that bear out 
that conclusion. 53 U.S.L.W. at 5039 n.16.
As the quotations throughout this Appendix suggest, 
Justice Marshall, writing in dissent for four members of the 
Court, was even more explicit in detailing the ways in which 
civil RICO claims have caused disruptions far beyond anything 
intended by Congress, but the majority did not disagree with 
the dissenters' descriptions. Justice Marshall detailed the  
♦ 
ways that "in both theory and practice, civil RICO has brought 
profound changes to our legal landscape,” id. at 5041, and he 
recognized that "nothing in the language of the statute or the 
legislative history suggests that Congress intended either the 
federalization of state common law or the displacement of 
existing federal remedy.” Id. Justice Marshall's opinion 
summarized the problematic results of civil RICO: 
"These cases take their toll; their results 
distort the market by saddling legitimate 
businesses with uncalled-for punitive bills 
and undeserved labels. To allow punitive 
actions and significant damages for injury 
beyond that which the statute was intended 
to target is to achieve nothing the statute 
sought to achieve, and ironically to injure 
many of those lawful businesses that the 
statute sought to protect." Id. at 5045.
Justice Marshall as a general matter is neither a strident 
supporter of states’ rights nor an advocate of business
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interests against the injured individual; yet he concluded in 
no uncertain terns that civil RICO has unintentionally altered 
the balance between federal and state law in a profound manner 
and has made legitimate businesses a target of "uncalled-for 
punitive bills and undeserved labels." Id. at 5045.
Justice Powell, who joined in Justice Marshall's 
opinion, also wrote separately, reiterating the manner in 
which civil RICO has come to be used "against legitimate 
businesses seeking treble damages in ordinary fraud and 
contract cases,” and concluding that "it defies rational 
belief, particularly in light of the legislative history, 
that Congress intended this far-reaching result." Id. at 
5047.
The majority and minority parted company only over 
the question of whether the courts could play any role in 
narrowing civil RICO's reach. The minority believed that 
the language of the statute could plausibly be interpreted 
narrowly in certain respects. The majority, applying its 
philosophical belief that the courts should not rewrite 
statutes, accepted the premise that the statute is being used 
in unintended ways but rejected the notion that the Court 
could play any role in solving that dilemma. The majority 
placed responsibility for solving the problem upon the repre­
sentative body that passed the statute in the first place: 
"(T]his defect — if defect it is — is inherent in the
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statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress." 
Id. at 5039 (emphasis added).
F. Civil RICO Claims Against 
Legitimate Businesses Are Burgeoning 
It is likely that, in the face of the Supreme 
Court's rejection of the major judicial attempts to construe 
civil RICO narrowly and its deferral to Congress to correct 
the overbreadth, RICO suits simply alleging securities fraud, 
commercial fraud, or other "imaginative" claims will continue 
to grow. The situation is already out of hand and likely to 
get worse.
Relatively few private RICO cases have progressed 
* • 
all the way to judgment, because intensive use of the statute 
in civil cases only began to blossom a few years ago. The ABA 
RICO Task Force Report found that, although the statute was 
enacted in 1970, there was only one reported opinion in a 
civil RICO case as of 1972, only one other case reported prior 
to 1975, and only nine reported decisions prior to 1980. ABA 
RICO Task Force Report at 55. Since then, the numbers have 
grown exponentially. Id. See also p. 14 n.2, supra. The 
invocation of RICO against legitimate businesses in kinds of 
disputes never contemplated by Congress when it passed RICO is 
almost certain to accelerate in the wake of the recent Supreme 
Court decisions, since the Court has eliminated almost any 
chance that previously existed that a defendant could defeat 
a RICO claim at the threshold of litigation. Reflecting this 
impact, the Washington Post headlined its article on the Sedima 
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decision: "RULING SEEN INCREASING OUT-OF-COURT SETTLEMENTS: 
More Costly Litigation Also Predicted." Abramowitz, Washing­
ton Post, July 2 1985, at E10.
In addition, there is rapidly spreading publicity 
about the utility of RICO as a device for getting a local 
commercial dispute into federal court or as a tactic for 
dramatically increasing the stakes in a case otherwise covered 
by the traditional single-damage remedy of other, specific 
federal laws, such as the securities laws. The Washington 
Post story on Sedima quoted a leading plaintiff's attorney 
who predicted that civil RICO would be used increasingly in 
the future to "federalize" product liability Litigation. Id.   
The same day, the Wall Street Journal also commented that 
civil RICO suits, "few of which involve organized crime, are 
proliferating because they can be quite lucrative." Wermeil, 
"Supreme Court Refuses to Curb Racketeer Law," Wall Street 
Journal, July 2, 1985, at 2. The article summarized the 
lure: "Plaintiffs favor RICO because of the chance to triple 
damages and win attorneys' fees and legal costs, and because 
it poses fewer procedural hurdles than federal securities law 
or state contract law." Id. As another article discussing 
the wider use of civil RICO expected in the wake of the 
Supreme Court's decision put it in its headline: "'Sedima': 
The Civil RICO's Juggernaut Steams On." Mathews and Weissman, 
Legal Times (ABA Daily Ed.), July 9, 1985, at 10.
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Legal and business journals are filled with articles 
discussing the statute. See, e.g., Blakey, "RICO Is Working," 
The Brief (the magazine published by the Tort and Insurance 
Practice Section of the American Bar Association), Summer 1985, 
at 18; Quinn and Bograd, "RICO Is Backfiring," id. at 19; 
Pickholz, "The Firestorm Over Civil RICO,* 71 ABA Journal 79 
(1985); Skinner and Tone, "Recent Developments in RICO Litiga­
tion," National Law Journal, February 13, 1984, at 20; Skinner 
and Tone, "Civil RICO and the Corporate Defendant," National 
Law Journal, January 30, 1984, at 22; Flaherty, "Private RICO 
Damages Awarded," National Law Journal, December 26, 1983, at 
8; Sylvester, "Civil RICO's New Punch," National Law journal, 
February 7, 1983, at 1; Weissmann, "'Moss' Makes RICO Statute 
the Darling of Plaintiffs' Bar," Legal Times, December 19, 
1983, at 24; Murphy, "RICO — A Federal Treble Damage Fraud 
Statute?", New York State Bar Journal, July 1983, at 18; 
"Business is Picking Up An Anticrime Weapon," Business Week, 
February 20, 1984, at 85.
So too, law reviews are focusing a great deal of 
attention on the statute, debating the extent of its flaws 
and the proper methods of correcting them. See, e.g., Civil 
RICO Symposium, 21 Cal. W. L. Rev. No. 2 (1985); Comment, 
Sedima v. Imrex: Civil Immunity for Unprosecuted RICO Vio­
lations?, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 419 (1985); Note, Civil RICO: A 
Call For A Uniform Statute of Limitations, 13 Fordham Urban 
L.J. 205 (1984); Sackheim, Leto & Friedman, Commodities Liti­
gation: The Impact of RICO, 34 DePaul L. Rev. 23 (1984);
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Tyson 6 August, The Williams Act After RICO: Has The Balance 
Tipped In Favor Of Incumbent Management, 35 Hastings L.J. 53 
(1983); Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limita­
tion, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1513 (1983); Note, Civil RICO: The 
Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 Barv. 
L. Rev. 1101 (1982); Campbell, Civil RICO Actions in Commercial 
Litigation, 36 Sw. L.J. 925 (1982). One recently published 
bibliography listed approximately 150 articles on civil RICO 
that have appeared in legal publications. See Milner, A Civil 
RICO Bibliography, 21 Cal. W.L. Rev. 409, 427-35 (1985).
Numerous how-to-do-it courses are being offered 
nationwide to acquaint lawyers with RICO’s possibilities.  
For example, the ABA already has held four "continuing legal 
education” National Institutes on RICO, three in New York City 
in September 1983, February 1984 and October 1984, and one in 
Los Angeles in November 1983. With ominous accuracy the ABA 
titled the first three of these sessions "RICO: The Ultimate 
Weapon in Business and Commercial Litigation." The latest 
session, in New York, was entitled "RICO — The Second Stage." 
Among the featured topics at the October 1984 meeting were 
discussions of RICO and its impact on states and municipali­
ties, RICO suits by and against unions, and RICO suits against 
financial institutions. The popularity of the presentations is 
great; the mailing for the February 1984 course pointed out 
that the two earlier meetings were sold out, with over 600 
lawyers in attendance. Moreover, one of the programs held at 
the ABA's August 1984 annual convention was entitled "RICO:
38
The Current Status of Baby Huey,” and at its most recent 
convention just completed in July 1985, the ABA again had 
a major program on current developments in civil RICO.
The Practicing Law Institute (”PLI”) also held RICO 
sessions in June of 1984 both in New York City and in San 
Francisco, with topics including the use of RICO in "antitrust 
cases,” "commercial bribery and faithless employee cases,” 
"unfair competition cases,” "securities and commodities cases,” 
and "corporate takeover cases.” In addition, Law & Business, 
Inc., offered RICO programs in Chicago in June and in San 
Francisco in July of last year and plans similar progams in 
New York, San Francisco, and Chicago in September, October,   
and November 1985, respectively.
The volume of RICO litigation is expected to be 
so heavy that a special reporting service called the "RICO 
Litigation Reporter" — now renamed the "RICO Law Reporter" — 
began regular publication in May 1984, and two additional 
reporting services devoted exclusively to this subject recently 
began publishing. The recent Supreme Court decisions, with 
the attendant publicity as well as the substantive message 
contained in those decisions that it is all right to use civil 
RICO broadly, will only increase the spotlight on civil RICO’s 
potential uses as a weapon in commercial litigation.
The bonanza for lawyers in RICO cases is widely 
and candidly recognized. Indeed, when the Los Angeles Times 
did a series of articles last year on "the litigation explo­
sion," it devoted a front page article just to private civil
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RICO suits, entitling the feature, "'RICO’ Running Amok in the 
Board Rooms," and subtitling the piece, "Law aimed at Mafia 
becomes popular in private suits." Siegel, Los Angeles Times, 
February 15, 1984. The article quoted one RICO lawyer as 
explaining that when he set up his private law practice he 
*was looking for a way to develop business,* and he *studied 
RICO and saw the potential for lots of civil litigation." As 
the Supreme Court recognized, as long as the statute remains 
worded broadly, lawyers will have every incentive to continue 
pushing its use to the outer limits of the statutory language. 
As one author counseled:
*[A] plaintiff's attorney zealously protecting 
the rights of his client, as he is charged to 
do, is obligated to bring RICO claims where 
they can reasonably be interposed.” Brodsky, 
"RICO," New York Law Journal, February 15, 1984, 
at p. 1, Col. 1.
Of course, in addition to multiple damages, the 
plaintiffs in these actions seek attorney's fees. While there 
are few civil RICO cases that have progressed far enough to 
have reached the fee-determination stage, the amounts at issue 
are substantial.13/ Awards of hundreds of thousands or even 
millions of dollars are not uncommon under other statutes that 
contain similar "fee shifting" provisions. The prospect of
13/For example, in Schacht v. Brown, supra, the lead 
counsel for the plaintiff Insurance Commissioner reported 
billings of $363,737.00 through September of 1982. "Insurance 
Liquidations a Legal Bonanza," Chicago Tribune, September 12, 
1982, § 5 at 1. This may include expenses for some items 
in addition to the Schacht litigation itself, but the vast 
majority is almost certainly for that civil RICO action, in 
a period before any significant discovery had commenced.
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such handsome awards is a powerful stimulus to press RICO to 
even newer frontiers.
V. REFORM OF CIVIL "RICO" SHOULD REINTRODUCE 
THE IMPORTANT OVERSIGHT BY FEDERAL AND 
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTORS BY CREATING A 
PRIOR-CRIMINAL-CONVICTION REQUIREMENT
A. The Administration, The Courts, And 
Others Have Recognized The Need For Reform
The explosion of unjustified civil RICO cases is 
already at hand, and the adverse effects of this development 
on the courts and on legitimate business are direct, palpable, 
and unwarranted. It would be difficult to overstate the in 
terrorem effect of civil RICO on legitimate businesses, even 
though relatively few companies, so far, actually have been 
ordered to pay treble damages in these cases. As Business 
Week reported: 
"Lawyers say the number of court awards under RICO 
is not an accurate measure of the problem, because 
few cases go to trial: The mere threat of a headline 
suggesting a connection with organized crime often 
induces a settlement." February 20, 1984, at 85.
In addition, the scope of the permissible allegations permits 
wide-ranging pre-trial discovery: "That gets very, very 
expensive," one securities lawyer was quoted as explaining, 
"and the cost tends to result in settlements." Id. As Justice 
Marshall himself recognized, a "defendant, facing a tremendous 
financial exposure in addition to the threat of being labelled 
a ’racketeer,' will have a strong interest in settling the 
dispute," 53 U.S.L.W. at 5041, "even a case with no merit." 
Id.
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In urging reform, the American Bar Association has
stated:
"When RICO is combined with mail fraud predicate 
offenses, the effect is to federalize all torts 
involving business transactions in which a party 
thinks deceitfully and uses the mails. This 
result is undesirable in two respects: (1) the 
efficient operation of federal courts will be 
significantly impaired, if not crippled, by a tidal 
wave of RICO civil actions when plaintiffs become 
aware of the attractions of treble damages and 
recovery of attorney's fees; and (2) the balance 
between state and federal power will be substan­
tially disrupted. If future RICO statutes are 
to include civil remedies, use of mail fraud as 
a predicate offense must be limited." Reports 
with Recommendations to the House of Delegates, 
ABA, 1982 Annual Meeting, August 1982, Report 
No. 112C at 8, adopted by the House of Delegates 
August 1982. 
 
According to the recent ABA RICO Task Force Report, fully 741
of all lawyers surveyed with actual experience with RICO 
claims, either as counsel for plaintiffs or for defendants, 
believe that the statute should be amended, and only 8% see 
no need for reform. ABA RICO Task Force Report at 62.
From his unique vantage point as a regulator of the 
securities industry and the accounting profession, SEC Commis­
sioner Charles L. Marinaccio expressed his view that civil RICO 
has "gone awry in the execution," and is being used against 
"the very legitimate corporations and businesses that were 
intended to be protected" to undermine the "carefully crafted 
structures" of express and implied remedies under state and 
federal securities laws. See Statement of Charles L. Marinac­
cio, Member of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Before 
the Committee on The Judiciary, United States Senate, May 20,
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1985, Exhibit 3. As the Commissioner told this Committee in 
testimony in May of this year, "I believe there is an urgent 
need to amend RICO by legislation to end the excessive uses to 
which the statute's private civil remedy has been put." Id. at 
1. The Commissioner recounted the ways in which private civil 
RICO is "threatening to disrupt the balance of the (federal 
securities] regulatory scheme," id. at 6, and he concluded that 
"predicating the availability of a private remedy on prior 
criminal convictions offers the most reasonable way to mitigate 
problems in the securities fraud area." Id. at 8. The Chair­
man of the SEC, John S.R. Shad, has also expressed concern 
about the unintended impact of civil RICO on "the carefully 
crafted scheme of express and implied remedies for securities 
law violations which the Congress and the courts have fashioned 
over the past 50 years." Id. Exh. 2.
Federal judges, acting in their capacity as com­
mentators on what they are witnessing, also have spoken out 
in public about the problem. Thus, District Judge Milton 
Pollack of New York has said: 
"(0]ne of the proliferating developments in civil 
litigation has been the use of RICO, the Racketeer 
Influenced and [Corrupt] Organizations Act, in 
civil claims, in routine commercial disputes, 
including those arising under the Federal Securi­
ties Laws. I think that the proliferation of 
those claims and the use of a law that was designed 
to eliminate organized crime is a very bad influ­
ence on the commercial community." "Symposium 
Highlighting Developments in Securities Law Over 
Past Century," New York Law Journal, January 30, 
1984, at 52.
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And Judge Abner Mikva of the United States Court of 
Appeals in the District of Columbia, who had warned against the 
overbreadth of the proposed RICO bill when he was in Congress 
in 1970, has seen RICO outstrip his worst fears. Be warned 
then that placing a treble-damage remedy under so broadly 
worded a statute would provide an "invitation” to the "dis­
gruntled and malicious” to "harass innocent businessmen . . . .” 
H. R. Rep. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4007, 4083. As he predicted, "What 
a protracted, expensive trial may not succeed in doing, the 
adverse publicity may well accomplish — destruction of the 
rival's business.” Id. Judge Mikva was quoted in an interview 
as expressing regret that these problems were not avoided by 
complete deletion of the civil provision, which "was not an 
important element of the legislation." Los Angeles Times, 
February 15, 1984.
In their formal opinions as well, many courts, as 
the Supreme Court did in Sedima, have warned about these 
dangers and abuses, even while deciding that they are obliged 
to apply the expansive language of the statute as originally 
written. For example, in allowing a mail fraud allegation to 
proceed as a RICO case, the Seventh Circuit in Schacht ruefully 
observed that Congress inadvertently "may well have created 
a runaway treble damage bonanza for the already excessively 
litigious." Schacht v. Brown, supra, 711 F.2d at 1361. In 
another Seventh Circuit case, the court observed that RICO 
"is constructed on the model of a treasure hunt," Sutliff,
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Inc. v. Donovan Cos., supra, 727 F.2d at 652, and went out of
its way to comment:
"We must abide by Congress's decision, made at a 
time of less sensitivity than today to the workload 
pressures on the federal courts and to the desir­
ability of maintaining a reasonable balance between 
state and federal courts, however much we may regret 
not only the burdens that the decision has cast 
on the federal courts but also the displacement of 
state tort law into the federal courts that it has 
brought about." Id. at 654.
The Administration has heard these calls for reform 
and has decided that they are well founded. The Vice Presi­
dent's Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services, whose 
members included the Attorney General, recognized in its final 
report adopted on July 2, 1984, that civil RICO. is being . • 
abused. The Task Group found that:
"[A] statute designed to control organized crime 
through both criminal and civil penalties against 
racketeering . . . has increasingly been utilized 
by imaginative lawyers in suits against banks, 
securities firms, accountants and other perfectly 
legitimate businesses without even any alleged 
connection to organized crime."
The Report continued:
"This litigation increases the backlog in federal 
courts, undermines the structure of the substantive 
banking and securities laws enacted by Congress, and 
creates totally unnecessary costs for the affected 
firms and, ultimately, their customers."
Accordingly, one of the Task Group's recommendations (number
5.15) calls for "Elimination of Nuisance Litigation Under RICO.
Without defining precisely how RICO should be amended, the Task 
Group states as the Administration's goal the formulation of 
amendments "to ensure that its civil liability provisions are
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not Misused by private parties in litigation involving finan­
cial institutions."
Attorney General Neese expressed similar concerns 
during his nomination hearing before this very Committee. In 
response to a question from Senator Grassley about RICO, Mr. 
Meese stated:
"I share with you your concern that what is essen­
tially a form of action against criminal activity, 
even though with civil penalties and civil actions 
involved — that this not be misused as a means of 
carrying on ordinary civil litigation where no 
organized crime is involved." Transcript of Pro­
ceedings (Jan. 30, 1985) at 13.
B. The Justice Department's RICO Guidelines 
Apply The Prosecutorial Discretion Envisioned 
By Congress, And Absent From Private Actions, 
That Prevents Abuse Of RICO
In 1981, the Criminal Division of the United States 
Department of Justice promulgated "Guidelines” for the exercise 
of the Department's power to initiate criminal prosecutions 
under RICO. See U.S. Department of Justice, United States 
Attorneys' Manual, §§ 9-110.200 - 110.500 (March 9, 1984). The 
Guidelines were promulgated because the Department recognized 
the great possibility for abuse if RICO is applied to every set 
of circumstances that may conceivably be covered by the broad 
statutory language. These Guidelines in effect formalize the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion that Congress envisioned 
when it wrote this broadly worded statute.
In their "Preface," the Guidelines state that, 
despite the statutory provision that RICO is to be "liberally 
construed to effectuate its remedial purpose," it is the
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policy of the Department of Justice that RICO should only be 
used "selectively." The Guidelines are designed to assure 
"that not every case, in which technically the elements of a 
RICO violation exists, will result in the approval of a RICO 
charge." The Justice Department will not "approve 'imagina­
tive' prosecutions under RICO which are far afield from the 
Congressional purpose of the RICO statute.” As the Guidelines 
recognize, "the activity which Congress most directly addressed 
— the infiltration of organized crime in the nation's economy" 
— is the touchstone for determining whether a RICO charge is 
warranted.
Moreover, the overall theme of the Guidelines, as 
stated in their Preface, is that "the consequences for the 
accused" require "particularly careful and reasoned applica­
tion" of RICO's purposes before making the decision to charge 
a RICO violation. Accordingly, the Guidelines insist on care­
ful monitoring and centralized control over the Government's 
filing of any RICO charge. This centralized monitoring guaran­
tees that the Guidelines will be effectively enforced by offi­
cials who are charged with public accountability. In dramatic 
contrast, the decision whether to file a private RICO claim 
under the broadly worded statute is currently left wholly to 
the discretion of entrepreneurial private lawyers. Their sole 
loyalty is to their private clients, and they have no public 
responsibility for the consequences of any extravagant allega­
tions .
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The Justice Department Guidelines highlight another 
problem with civil RICO as it currently stands. The Preface 
states that the Department ordinarily will not add a RICO 
charge "which merely duplicates the elements of proof of a 
traditional" statute that specifically covers the conduct in 
question. One of the major criticisms of the current civil 
RICO provision, however, is that it creates a general, private 
federal claim for treble damages even where federal law already 
provides a carefully crafted set of prohibitions and remedies.
The Justice Department's Guideline III expressly 
directs that, except in extraordinary circumstances, a RICO 
count will not be asserted "where the. predicate acts consist * 
solely and only of state offenses." Reflecting important 
considerations of federalism, the commentary explains that 
this guideline is designed "to underscore the principle that 
prosecution of state crimes ... is primarily the responsi­
bility of state authority."
Similar observations apply to the use of the fed­
eral courts to litigate civil disputes governed by state law. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of "mail fraud" and "wire fraud" 
in RICO has been used by private plaintiffs as a device for 
bringing into federal courts what are essentially local commer­
cial or property disputes. This use of RICO has "federalized" 
state commercial and tort cases.
The statute suggests that any two occurrences of a 
predicate violation within ten years may be sufficient to show 
a "pattern of racketeering activity." Guideline IV recognizes
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that this definition is subject to abuse and provides that no 
RICO count will be charged "based upon a pattern of racketeer­
ing activity growing out of a single criminal episode or 
transaction."
Most of the private civil cases that have been filed 
under RICO, by contrast, relate to allegedly fraudulent activ­
ity in connection with a single episode or transaction, such as 
the sale of stock in a single company or the structuring of a 
particular venture that includes a number of parties. Since 
each mailing of, for example, a copy of an allegedly misleading 
financial statement constitutes a separate violation, it is 
easy for the artful pleader .to allege a "pattern" of racketeer­
ing in connection with a single commercial episode or transac­
tion. This usage, however, has little to do with the congres­
sional goal of cracking down on racketeers who make their 
living by engaging in a continuous pattern of illicit activity 
over a long career.
In addition, Guideline V states that, in order to 
constitute a violation of RICO, the "pattern of racketeering 
activity" should have "some relation to the purpose of the 
enterprise." This sensible interpretation is not followed in 
the civil cases that have been filed under RICO, where alleg­
edly fraudulent activities conducted by legitimate businesses 
such as investment banking houses, brokerage firms, accounting 
firms, law firms, and others are — even if true — aberra­
tional rather than related to the purpose of those "enter­
prises."
49
Many of the concerns reflected in the Justice 
Department Guidelines, thus, apply with equal force to private 
civil litigation under RICO. These internal Guidelines, 
however, do not regulate the activity of private plaintiffs. 
Therefore, legislation is necessary in order to erect similar 
safeguards around the private civil RICO mechanism and in that 
way to minimize its great potential for abuse.
C. A Prior-Criminal-Conviction Requirement 
Is The Most Straight-Forward And Workable 
Solution To The Current Abuse Of Civil RICO 
There is one straight-forward amendment to civil 
RICO that would eliminate the existing abuses, refocus the 
statute on its intended targets, and adapt the Justice Depart­   
merit’s Guidelines to the civil use of RICO. That would be 
to permit civil claims to proceed under RICO only after 
the defendant has been convicted of a RICO offense or of one 
of the predicate offenses. This amendment would effectively 
curb the abuse of the discretionary power to bring private 
claims against legitimate business people involved in ordinary 
commercial activities. It would confine the circumstances 
in which suits can be filed to those in which public prose­
cutors have screened those people who may fairly be charged 
with being involved in crimes from those who should not be 
subject to accusations of "racketeering". This is the kind of 
protection that a panel of the Second Circuit read into RICO 
in the Sedima case and that SEC Commissioner Marinaccio called 
upon Congress to write into the statute.
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The American Bar Association's Special Task Force 
on Civil RICO also recognized that a prior criminal conviction 
requirement would eliminate the abuse of civil RICO and restore 
the statute to the purpose Congress originally intended: 
"Requiring a criminal conviction as a predicate 
to civil treble damage liability under RICO would 
alleviate virtually all the problems critics have 
posed concerning overbreadth of the civil remedy." 
ABA RICO Task Force Report at 222.
What is needed is legislation that will amend 18 
U.S.C. § 1964(c) so that a private civil plaintiff could only 
bring suit against a defendant who has been convicted either 
of one of the predicate acts or of a RICO violation itself. 
In either case, the conviction would have to be for the   
conduct upon which the private suit is based. (We attach 
as Exhibit A to this Appendix proposed language to accomplish 
this result. The suggested amendment would also set a statute 
of limitations of one year, measured from the latest judgment 
of conviction for RICO or the civil predicate acts upon which 
the civil action is based. This proposal is identical to H.R. 
2943, introduced on July 10, 1985, by Representative Boucher.) 
Under this amendment, civil RICO could no longer be 
used simply to raise the stakes in or federalize commercial 
disputes. The plaintiff would have to prove that:
(1) the defendant violated the provisions 
of RICO by engaging in conduct that 
violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962;
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(2) the defendant has been convicted either 
of a RICO violation or of one of the 
predicate acts based on the conduct 
upon which the plaintiff bases his 
civil RICO claim;
(3) the plaintiff has been injured in his 
business or property by the defendant's 
violation of Section 1962; and
(4) the plaintiff has filed his treble-damage 
suit within one year of the latest per­
tinent convictions.
With this change in the law, civil RICO could only 
be used against persons whom prosecutors have decided to charge 
with crimes and who have been found guilty of criminal acts. 
This amendment would restore the central role of public pro­
secutors originally envisioned by Congress. Before plaintiffs 
could call upon the treble-damage remedy made available under 
RICO specifically to deal with organized crime, there would 
first have to be a determination by the public prosecutors and 
juries that the defendant was actually engaged in criminal 
activity.
The ABA RICO Task Force Report agrees that the 
creation of some prior criminal conviction requirement "would 
be preferable to the present statute and its intolerable 
overbreadth." ABA RICO Task Force Report at 238. Neverthe­
less, instead of this direct and precise solution, the ABA 
Task Force offers as an alternative a package of ten different 
substantive changes in the statute in order to achieve the 
same basic result as the prior criminal conviction requirement 
— returning civil RICO to its proper focus. That laundry
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list of changes, however, is cumbersome. It is likely to 
raise complex problems in the course of drafting and implemen­
tation. In fact, the drafting issues were so unwieldy that 
the Task Force did not even attempt to offer specific statutory 
language to implement its proposals.
Furthermore, most changes in statutory language, no 
matter how minor, raise issues of interpretation and implemen­
tation unanticipated at the time of passage. An approach 
that requires ten major changes is certain to create many new 
issues. The prior criminal conviction requirement achieves 
the same result with but one simple amendment. It has already 
been drafted and its impact has been subjected to intense * 
scrutiny and conjecture by its proponents and opponents alike. 
As the following discussion demonstrates, despite that intense 
scrutiny, no major problems that would arise from its implemen­
tation have been identified.
The ABA RICO Task Force alternatively suggests that 
if some version of a prior criminal conviction requirement 
is adopted, the Congress should consider making treble damages 
available only where there are prior criminal convictions, 
but allow private plaintiffs to sue for actual damages even 
where there have been no previous convictions. ABA RICO Task 
Force Report at 238. Such a change would, of course, not 
solve the underlying problem, which is the use of civil RICO 
for unintended and abusive purposes. Two major opportunities 
to abuse civil RICO would remain. First, plaintiffs would 
still be able to increase the in terrorem effect of their
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suits — and hence their settlement value, whatever the merits 
of the cases — because of the coercive effect of even an 
unsubstantiated accusation of "racketeering." Second, plain­
tiffs would be able to "federalize" traditional state law tort 
and contract claims by recasting them as RICO cases, and thus 
accelerate the growth of cases on the federal court dockets 
that rightfully belong in the state legal systems, if anywhere. 
Thus, all civil RICO claims should be subject to a prior 
conviction requirement.
D. None Of The Criticisms Of A Prior Criminal 
Conviction Requirement Is Substantial
Persons eager to preserve the potent weapon which 
 
civil RICO has become in ordinary commercial litigation have 
repeatedly thrown out a laundry list of so-called problems 
associated with a prior-criminal-conviction requirement. 
Through repetition — and undoubtedly because to date these 
claims have generally gone unanswered — these assertions 
have taken on more credence than they deserve, and we find 
less jaundiced observers, such as the ABA RICO Task Force 
and the five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court in Sedima, 
repeating these criticisms. In truth, if these so-called 
problems are examined one by one, one discovers that there 
is no real substantial impediments behind the rhetoric.14/
14/14/ The proof, in part, is in the doing. We discussed 
earlier cases in which plaintiffs brought civil RICO cases 
against defendants who had first been convicted on criminal 
charges. See pp. 16-17, supra. There is no indication in any 
of these cases that the plaintiffs found insurmountable prob­
lems or even substantial difficulties in bringing those law­
suits .
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1. "Gutting" the civil remedies 
A criminal conviction precondition to private civil 
RICO actions would not "gut" the remedies available to private 
parties, as some critics of a prior-criminal-conviction 
requirement charge. As our earlier discussion demonstrates, 
there already have been cases in which plaintiffs have used 
civil RICO to go after defendants who had been first convicted 
of criminal charges. See pp. 16-17, supra. Cases of this 
type would continue. Moreover, if there has been no criminal 
prosecution and conviction, a potential plaintiff would still 
have available all the other federal and state law remedies 
that apply to commercial disputes and torts; he would not be* 
left without a remedy.
2. The "private attorney general" rationale 
The ABA Task Force suggests that the criminal con­
viction requirement may be "too restrictive" because it would 
eliminate "what some courts have labelled the useful 'private 
attorney general’ aspect of Civil RICO." ABA RICO Task Force 
Report at 238. The Supreme Court majority in Sedima similarly 
referred to Section 1964(c) as a "private attorney general 
"provision []." 53 U.S.L.W. at 5038. This view, however,
rests on the erroneous assumption that civil RICO was meant 
to deputize private claimants and their lawyers to serve as 
"private attorneys general." The private damage remedy under 
RICO, however, was not created in order to empower private 
citizens to take on law enforcement responsibilities, and
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there is no good reason to view the statute today as serving 
that end.
No one who has taken a hard look at the problem of 
organized crime -- not the Kefauver Committee in the 1950s, 
not the Katzbach Commission in the 1960s, not Senator McClel­
lan’s Committee in the 1960s and 1970s -- has ever believed 
that private civil suits could be an important weapon in the 
war against organized crime. Significantly, the Department 
of Justice itself has never suggested that it believes that 
private citizens should have the right to accuse other persons 
of crimes, nor has the Justice Department indicated that pri­
vate suits are necessary to supplement its efforts to attack 
organized crime.
Indeed, it would be foolish to believe that a private 
citizen would have the temerity to sue a real organized crime 
figure for racketeering, unless the government has first prose­
cuted and convicted him. There is no indication that anyone in 
Congress entertained that naive belief when RICO was passed in 
1970. The lesson of the last 15 years' experience with civil 
RICO confirms the sensible assumption that criminal conviction 
is, as a practical matter, a necessary precondition to private 
RICO suits against the kind of criminal Congress had in its 
sights. In the few civil RICO cases that have been brought 
against violent organized crime figures, private suits actually 
have followed prosecution and conviction, and have not been a 
substitute for criminal conviction. See pp. 16-17, supra.
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Thus, the only impact from adopting a criminal conviction 
requirement would be to filter out the suits that have nothing 
to do with the war on organized crime.
Moreover, Assistant Attorney General Trott's testi­
mony before this Committee in May 1985 shows that the Justice 
Department has brought RICO prosecutions in at least as many 
cases as civil litigants are using the statute, and the number 
of federal criminal cases is growing. Federal and state 
prosecutors, of course, bring thousands of non-RICO prosecu­
tions involving the predicate offenses listed in RICO. It is 
baseless to assert that the targets of the private civil RICO 
cases that private lawyers have brought in the absence of 
prior convictions would have been prosecuted if only federal 
and state prosecutors had more resources. The simple truth 
is, as the Executive Director of the ABA RICO Task Force 
acknowledged elsewhere, these private civil suits are brought 
in cases that no responsible prosecutor would have treated as 
criminal. See pp. 17-18, supra.
3. Possible effects on public prosecutors 
The opponents of the prior-criminal-conviction 
requirement assert that this requirement could influence the 
way public prosecutors perform their duties. They speculate:
(1) Federal prosecutors could be subject to 
undue pressures from private parties with 
potential civil RICO claims to press RICO- 
related prosecutions.
(2) Prosecutors may be subject to accusations 
that they were influenced in their decisions 
to press RICO-related prosecutions because of 
the impact on individuals' civil remedies.
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(3) Prosecutors nay be willing to accept plea 
bargains that are unrelated to the merits 
of the case. The criminal conviction 
requirement, it is suggested, could create 
a powerful new weapon in the hands of the 
prosecutor to force defendants to plead to 
lesser, non-predicate-act offenses. If 
prosecutors accept pleas to non-predicate 
act offenses, private litigants would lose 
their opportunity for civil relief, or at 
least lose the opportunity to sue certain 
defendants.
The fact is that public prosecutors already are 
subject to the entreaties of private parties whose interests 
are at stake in criminal proceedings. In the full range of 
potential civil litigation, from murder and arson to securities 
fraud and antitrust, there are private parties whose ability 
to win civil damage suits would be vastly enhanced by a suc­
cessful criminal prosecution. The public prosecutor's duty, 
however, is to weigh those interests in balance along with 
other relevant factors in deciding where the public interest 
lies. There is simply no reason to presume that a RICO statute 
subject to a prior-criminal-conviction requirement would create 
pressures qualitatively different from those which already 
exist, or that the prosecutors would no longer be able to dis­
charge their duties fairly, or that the public perception of 
the prosecutor's decision-making would be adversely affected.
Nor is there any basis to assume that a federal pros­
ecutor will bargain away a good case against racketeers — 
either on the predicate offenses or the RICO charge itself — 
and thus foreclose an otherwise proper civil RICO case. Many 
of the predicate acts listed in the RICO statute do not have
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"lesser included offenses," and so it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to arrange a plea to a non-predicate offense 
in an organized crime case. Furthermore, plea bargaining in 
the federal courts has never been as extensive as in the over­
crowded and understaffed state court systems. Federal prose­
cutors simply do not bargain away good cases because of other 
constraints, such as limited resources. It is virtually 
unthinkable that federal prosecutors, despite public and 
congressional oversight, would irresponsibly agree to drop 
real organized crime cases in plea bargaining.
The decision to enter a plea bargain in federal 
court is governed principally by three general' considerations: 
(1) the severity of the crime; (2) the record of the defendant; 
and (3) the strength of the government's case. The United 
States Attorneys' Manual, which states the rules and guidelines 
that govern federal prosecutors, sets out eleven factors that 
the prosecutor must consider in "determining whether it would 
be appropriate to enter into a plea agreement." The factors 
at the top of the list include the "defendant's willingness to 
cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others," the 
defendant's criminal record, the nature of the charges, the 
defendant's "remorse or contrition," the "likelihood of obtain­
ing a conviction at trial," and similar concerns. Only at the 
end of this exhaustive list does the manual even mention 
consideration of prosecutorial and judicial resources. See 
U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual
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§ 9-27.420 (June 15, 1984). Thus, the Department of Justice's 
own standards will prevent prosecutors from allowing organized 
crime figures to escape with pleas to minor crimes.
Finally, as a practical matter, it is doubtful that 
fear of civil liability would be a major factor in a criminal 
defendant's decision whether to enter a plea bargain. More­
over, if it did provide an additional incentive to get organ­
ized crime figures to plead guilty and to cooperate with the 
federal authorities, Congress should encourage that result, 
not fear it. The primary purpose of RICO has always been, and 
should remain, to increase the weapons available to federal 
prosecutors in fighting organized crime. If the rare case 
comes along in which the prosecutor concludes that he can use 
the threat of a private civil suit to gain cooperation from 
a racketeer, purely private financial interests should not 
be allowed to frustrate the public interest in effective 
criminal law enforcement.
4. Possible effect on witness credibility 
Another concern that has been raised is that a wit­
ness's credibility would be subject to challenge at a criminal 
trial if he stands to gain from the conviction of the defen­
dant. Here again, a criminal conviction requirement would 
not qualitatively change the present situation. Any witness 
with an actual or potential civil claim against the defendant 
has a financial and personal stake in the success of the crimi­
nal prosecution; thus, the witness's credibility is already
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subject to challenge on that basis. Moreover, under modern 
notions of collateral estoppel, if the defendant is convicted 
on the charges, the factual issues resolved against the 
defendant by the verdict would in all likelihood be considered 
settled against him in a civil suit. See Parklane Hosiery Co. 
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Thus, under RICO as well as 
under other statutes, the benefit accruing to a victim/witness 
from a conviction in a parallel criminal proceeding already 
provides a basis for attacking the witness’s credibility in 
the criminal trial.
Indeed, if a criminal conviction is not a precondi­
tion to civil suit, the witness may have a civil suit pending.  
concurrently with his testimony in a criminal case. In the 
jury's eyes, this direct and specific interest in obtaining a 
conviction may cast more doubt on the witness's credibility 
than would the mere possibility that the witness might file a 
civil suit if the defendant is convicted. Thus, by postponing 
the ability to file a civil RICO suit, Congress could actually 
minimize questions about the complaining witness's credibility 
at the criminal trial and thereby enhance the statute's 
primary purpose, the prosecution and conviction of organized 
crime figures.
5. Delay in bringing the civil RICO suit 
Another category of issues raised about the prior- 
criminal-conviction requirement involves the timing of civil 
suits. The comments generally take the following form:
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(1) Uncertainty would exist as to when the 
statute of limitations begins to run 
on the RICO claim, and whether the 
civil plaintiff must wait until crimi­
nal appeals are exhausted.
(2) It is unclear what effect reversals or 
pleas of nolo contendere would have on 
civil RICO claims.
(3) Private parties would be forced to 
divide causes of action and bring two 
separate suits, because they have to 
go forward with their non-RICO claims 
before the statute of limitations runs 
out.
(4) Because of the long interval that can 
pass between the occurrence of a crime 
and a conviction, the private plain­
tiff's ability to pursue a civil remedy 
successfully could be prejudiced by (a) 
the staleness of evidence and (b) the 
defendant's dissipation or concealment 
of assets.
None of these worries is substantial. There is no 
difficulty in establishing the beginning of the limitations 
period. A claim does not accrue for purposes of a statute of 
limitations until all the elements of the plaintiff's cause of 
action exist. See, e.g., Impro Products, Inc. v. Block, 722 
F.2d 845, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 327 
(1984). If a prior criminal conviction constituted a necessary 
element of a civil RICO claims, the statute of limitations would 
not begin to run until the government secured the pertinent 
conviction. In any event, the amendment can include language 
that specifically links the limitations period to the date of 
the latest pertinent judgment of conviction, as does H.R. 2943.
The other issues can be handled equally easily under 
well-established principles of judicial procedure. By analogy 
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to principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, which 
take effect as soon as the trial court enters its judgment, the 
civil RICO suit could commence as soon as a judgment of convic­
tion is entered and need not wait until appeals have run their 
course. If one of the predicate convictions is reversed on 
appeal and remanded for a new trial, the civil action could be 
stayed during the proceedings on remand, or could be dismissed 
without prejudice to refiling at a later date if the defendant 
is re-convicted.
If in the criminal proceeding the defendant pleads 
nolo contendere or enters the kind of "no contest" plea the 
Supreme Court approved in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.  
25 (1970), the judgment in either case would lay the founda­
tion for a civil RICO complaint. The law treats either of 
those pleas as a confession of guilt, and the court renders 
a judgment of conviction. See id. at 35-37; Lott v. United 
States, 367 U.S. 421, 426-27 (1961). Once a conviction is 
entered, the private plaintiff could proceed accordingly with 
a RICO suit.
Nor is there any problem created because certain 
related causes of action might accrue before the civil RICO 
claim accrues. The premise underlying this concern is that 
the civil RICO remedy duplicates other existing federal or 
state remedies that the plaintiff may pursue. Since the 
purpose of creating the civil RICO remedy was to authorize 
redress for people who otherwise have no legal rights under
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other statutes and legal theories, this is an ironic objection. 
In cases of that sort, a potential RICO claim should be viewed 
as merely cumulative. The plaintiff has no legitimate griev­
ance if he must proceed with other remedies that the law 
already makes available to him.
In any event, if a plaintiff has both a potential 
RICO claim and a ripe claim under another legal theory, normal 
rules of procedure would govern. The plaintiff may bring his 
non-RICO claim on a timely basis. If he wishes to defer 
further proceedings in that suit until any criminal charges 
against the defendant are resolved, he may seek to stay his 
civil suit until the RICO claim ripens.. If he proceeds with 
the non-RICO claim, the established principles of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel would govern the impact of the outcome 
of that first action on any later RICO action. See 1B J. Moore 
J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice 11 0.441-0.448 
(2d ed. 1984). If he loses his non-RICO case claim after a 
fair opportunity to establish it, he has little reason to com­
plain that this decision would bar an overlapping RICO-related 
claim based on the same conduct.
If, by contrast, the plaintiff wins a damage award 
in his non-RICO suit based on the predicate acts, and then 
brings a proper RICO case, the damage awards may not completely 
overlap. His RICO claim may relate to a distinct type of 
injury and, in any event, would be trebled. To the degree 
that there is duplication, the second court would reduce the 
later award under established legal principles preventing
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duplicative awards for the same injury. See, e.g., American 
Mail Line, Ltd. v. Weaver, 408 F.2d 674, 675 (9th Cir. 1969).
The concerns expressed about the staleness of evi­
dence also suffer from similar underlying defects. A problem 
of stale evidence would seldom arise. As previously discussed, 
under modern notions of offensive collateral estoppel, the 
criminal conviction would probably establish the defendant's 
civil liability in the ensuing civil RICO suit, without even 
the need for further evidence. Moreover, all of the evidence 
collected through the government's resources and presented at 
the criminal trial would be available to the civil plaintiff.
In. any event, the plaintiff with a civil RICO claim 
may have to depend, for practical purposes, on a prior criminal 
proceeding. RICO defines a "pattern of racketeering," which 
even the civil plaintiff must allege and prove, as at least 
the commission of two predicate offenses within a ten-year 
span. Thus, no one may bring a civil RICO claim until the 
defendant has committed at least a second predicate offense, 
at which point the first offense may well be quite dated. 
In the absence of a prior criminal prosecution, a private 
party could have substantial difficulty proving the earlier 
predicate offense, especially if it involved an unrelated 
transaction, as it should. Thus, not only is the "lag time" 
in government prosecutions unlikely to undermine a plaintiff's 
ability to prove a proper civil RICO case, prior prosecution
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may well be a necessary component of a successful private 
civil case.15/
The prospect of dissipation of assets is also illu­
sory. Under the 1984 amendments to RICO, Congress gave the 
government expanded powers to bring forfeiture proceedings 
in conjunction with criminal charges under RICO and to obtain 
preliminary relief in the form of seizure of assets even prior 
to indictment. See Sec. 302, P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040-44 
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 1963). The government, therefore, has 
both the power and the incentive to prevent the defendant from 
secreting his assets. Moreover, under the 1984 amendments, 
the Attorney General is empowered to use the funds actually 
obtained through criminal forfeiture to "restore forfeited
15/It is true that some civil RICO plaintiffs have manu­
factured a "pattern" out of essentially simultaneous events, 
principally because separate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, 
or securities fraud can be pleaded for each instance in which 
the mail or telephone is used or each time a share is sold. 
See pp. 5-6, supra. But these are instances in which RICO is 
being abused to apply only to a single episode or transaction.
In cases actually involving organized crime, the predi­
cate acts will be more widely separated in time. The Justice 
Department recognizes that this separation in time is a char­
acteristic of a proper RICO case; under its RICO guidelines, 
the Department prohibits use of RICO to challenge conduct 
that is simply part of a single episode or transaction. U.S. 
Department of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual, ¶ 9- 
110.340 (March 9, 1984); see pp. 48-49, supra. As the Depart­
ment explicitly states in explaining this limitation, "the 
purpose of this guideline is to prevent a pattern of racketeer­
ing activity being charged which lacks the attributes which 
Congress had in mind but which is literally within the language 
of the statute." Id. at ¶ 9-110.341; see also Sedima, 53 
U.S.L.W. at 5038 n.14, 5039 (suggesting the statutory require­
ment of proof of a "pattern" demands something more than just 
proof of two predicate acts within ten years).
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property to victims” of a RICO violation or "take any other 
action to protect the rights of innocent persons” and "award 
compensation to persons providing information resulting in a 
forfeiture . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1963(h)(1) and (3). Thus, 
prior criminal proceedings actually may enhance the ability of 
civil plaintiffs to secure compensation.
Nor should one lose sight of the fact that persons 
with claims for relief arising from the predicate acts may 
press those claims immediately. If they have damage claims for 
securities fraud or commercial fraud, for example, they would 
not be inhibited from bringing those claims simply because 
there is a separate limitation designed solely to assure that" 
civil RICO claims deal only with actual criminal conduct. 
Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides ample 
remedies to the private plaintiff to assure that the defendant 
preserves enough assets to satisfy a potential judgment.
6. Inability to reach some of the culprits 
Finally, questions have been raised about whether it 
is sound to prevent private plaintiffs from bringing civil RICO 
suits against actual criminal offenders who, for some reason 
not related to their culpability, are not convicted.
We have already touched on one of these situations, 
where federal prosecutors are able to get one of the suspects 
to cooperate by allowing him to plea bargain to a non-predicate 
offense or even by immunizing him from all criminal liability. 
See, p. 60, supra. Traditionally, prosecutors have had great
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difficulty getting such cooperation from organized crime 
figures, because of the enormous risks faced by the member of 
organized crime who aids the government. The Department of 
Justice and Congress, therefore, should embrace, not reject, 
the opportunity to create a new incentive to get persons to 
give evidence against organized crime. Moreover, the private 
party in these hypothetical situations will still have other 
potential defendants to sue — those against whom the cooperat­
ing culprit testifies. It is also reasonable to assume that 
it will be the minor figures who are given the opportunity to 
plea bargain; the major targets, who are likely to have greater 
assets, will remain exposed to private civil RICO claims*. 
The other points voiced by opponents fall equally 
short. They are:
(1) If the indictment is dismissed for rea­
sons unrelated to the merits, the civil 
plaintiff will never be able to sue.
(2) Without changes in the legal concept 
of derivative liability, if individual 
principals are convicted of predicate 
acts, but the organization holding the 
assets is not, the civil plaintiff will 
not be able to reach the assets neces­
sary for compensation.
(3) If the criminal defendant remains a 
fugitive from justice, the criminal 
case will remain unresolved and the 
private plaintiff will go uncompensated 
even though the fugitive has assets in 
this country against which a civil award 
could be collected.
In fact, a fatal dismissal of an indictment for 
reasons unrelated to the merits occurs only in the rarest of
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cases. In virtually all instances in which the indictment 
is dismissed on technical grounds, the government can simply 
reindict. Federal law specifically provides for an extension 
of all statutes of limitations in order to guarantee federal 
prosecutors just such an opportunity to reindict. See 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3288-89.
Opponents of the criminal conviction requirement 
also conjure up the specter of a serious criminal case that 
the government cannot successfully prosecute after a court 
suppresses critical evidence because it was seized in viola­
tion of the Fourth Amendment. This is a far-fetched fear. 
Even before United States v. Leon,  U.S. 82 L.Ed.2d 
677 (1984), in which the Supreme Court created a substantial 
exception to the "exclusionary rule" for cases in which the 
police rely in good faith on a search warrant, the exclusionary 
rule actually had led to suppression of evidence in a miniscule 
proportion of all criminal cases. The empirical studies cited 
by the Supreme Court in the Leon case found that the exclu­
sionary rule affected the prosecution in the cases of only 
about 1% of the persons arrested for felonies. 82 L.Ed.2d at 
688 n.6. Since these figures relate to all persons arrested, 
the percentage of arrestees who were actually guilty but 
escaped conviction because of the suppression of evidence 
must have been even smaller.
Even those figures overstate the effect of the exclu­
sionary rule in organized crime cases, since most challenged
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searches and seizures involve street crimes investigated by 
local police, not carefully planned and supervised federal 
investigations of organized crime. It will be the careful 
investigations of organized crime activities, where search 
warrants are typically used, that will particularly benefit 
from the Supreme Court's recent decision in Leon to eliminate 
the exclusion when investigators rely on warrants.
Furthermore, even when the exclusionary rule applies, 
its scope is extremely limited. The illegally seized evidence 
may be used against all defendants except the particular person 
whose Fourth Amendment rights were actually violated. Brown 
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). Thus, the case against 
all co-conspirators and other defendants accused of partici­
pating in the racketeering enterprise would be unaffected. At 
bottom, then, only in the rarest of cases, if ever, would the 
Fourth Amendment block conviction on RICO-related charges and 
deprive an otherwise deserving plaintiff of the opportunity to 
pursue a civil RICO recovery.
Similarly insubstantial is the speculation that a 
conviction requirement could insulate from recovery the assets 
that a convicted racketeer has placed within some unconvicted 
enterprise. It is quite unlikely that an organized crime 
figure will place his assets in a business organization that 
is outside of his personal control. Rather, the enterprise 
will be operated in a form — such as a partnership or a joint 
venture — where the assets can be reached through a suit
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against ths individual. Even if the criminal resorts to a 
corporate form, the assets will still be reachable for at 
least one of two reasons. The criminal principal will own 
or control the stock of the corporation, in which case that 
stock, representing the value of the assets, can be reached. 
If the criminal does not own the enterprise outright, then 
he will undoubtedly be milking it or otherwise misusing the 
corporate form in a manner that will allow the court to "pierce 
the corporate veil," thus permitting the civil plaintiff to 
reach the assets at issue. See generally Note, Piercing the 
Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal 
Common Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev., 853 (1982). In sum, no criminal 
is simply going to give away his ill-gotten gains. As long as 
the assets remain his, the law provides the necessary tools to 
break through any formal barriers. Thus, the problem suppos­
edly posed by the conviction of the "principals" but not the 
"organization" is no problem at all.
Similarly, the defendant's fugitive status will 
rarely, if ever, stand in the way of a civil RICO claim. 
There are few places left in the world for an indicted crim­
inal to hide. According to the Office of the Legal Adviser 
at the Department of State, the United States currently has 
criminal extradition treaties with over one hundred nations, 
including all of the countries in which a wealthy racketeer 
might want to take refuge. Moreover, Congress cannot realis­
tically assume that all members of a criminal enterprise will
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successfully flee the United States and in that way escape 
conviction. Only in that extraordinarily unlikely event would 
a plaintiff be left with no target for a civil RICO suit. 
Thus, few if any proper civil RICO plaintiffs will be left 
without any civil recourse against any racketeer.
VI. CONCLUSION
The need for reform is clear. The nature of the 
reform is clear. And the responsibility for reform is clear. 
Congress should amend the civil provisions of RICO to focus 
the private remedy on its original purpose of aiding the war 
against organized crime, while curing its capacity to bludgeon 
innocent business people.
The easiest and best method to accomplish this 
purpose is to amend 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) to create a prior­
criminal-conviction requirement in private civil RICO actions. 
This type of amendment will give rise to the fewest complica­
tions. None of the arguments against this requirement stands 
up under analysis. The proper civil RICO plaintiff — the 
victim who has been damaged by actual criminal activity 
committed by a repeat criminal offender — will have a full 
and effective remedy. The only losers will be those persons 
who should have no legitimate claim to invoke this special 
statute at all.
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Amend subsection (c) of 18 U.S.C. S 1964 ("Civil 
remedies") to read as follows (new natter under­
scored, deleted natter bracketed):
* * *
"(c) Any person injured in his business or 
property by reason of conduct in [a] violation of 
section 1962 of this chapter nay sue [therefor) 
any person who engaged in that conduct and, with 
respect to such conduct, was convicted of racket­
eering activity or a violation of section 1962 in 
any appropriate United States district court, and 
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains 
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable 
attorney’s fee. A civil action under this sub­
section may not be commenced against a defendant 
later than one year after the entry of the latest 
judgment of conviction against the defendant for 
racketeering activity or a violation of section 
1962 with respect to the conduct out of which 
such action arises."
* * *
EXPLANATION
This amendment would limit the abuse of RICO's 
private, civil treble-damage mechanism under which claimants 
in many types of commercial disputes have been able to gain 
unwarranted leverage for their positions by branding their 
adversaries "racketeers." The amendment would implement
Congress' judgment that the use of RICO’s powerful weapons 
against "organized crime" should rest on the expertise and 
discretion of public prosecutors. The amendment would 
achieve those objectives by making it clear that the civil 
treble-damage provision is to be used only against persons 
whom prosecutors have decided to charge and whom juries 
have decided to convict of criminal violations of RICO or 
of the underlying "predicate" offenses.
Under this amendment the civil remedy would dovetail 
with the careful screening performed by the Department of 
Justice in applying its guidelines to distinguish cases that 
are properly subject to. the special RICO provisions from those 
that are not. It also would rely on determinations by federal 
and local prosecutors and juries that the defendants were actu­
ally engaged in criminal activity. Accordingly, the special 
civil treble-damage provisions of RICO would be directed only 
at those persons who may fairly be viewed as engaged in the 
business of "organized crime.” Ordinary commercial disputes 
and tort claims would be left exclusively to the other federal 
or state remedies that appropriately apply to them.
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